PiperAlpha: 20 Years on
On 6 July 1988, at about 10.00pm, Occidental's Piper Alpha platform, operating 120 miles off the north east coast of Scotland, exploded in a ball of flames 120m high. 167 people died and many others were horrifically injured as they jumped or fell into the sea 30m below. The insured loss was £1.7 billion. Lord Cullen's ensuing inquiry revealed a catalogue of management failings, as well as construction, engineering and operational inadequacies that would be inconceivable today.
Planting seeds of recovery
There is a part of all of us that agrees with the notion 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. But, equally, when it comes to plant maintenance and operations, the purpose of this activity is to minimise the risk to the business of expensive downtime or outage, and perhaps prevent it happening in the first place. The management and mitigation of risk and probability of unwanted events occurring is key to successful business continuity.
Safety under the microscope
With the publication in mid February of the final report into the 2005 Buncefield explosion and fire – Britain's most expensive industrial disaster – any remaining doubt that the primary causes were failings in safety management will have evaporated for ever.
It’s a (dangerous) gas
Gas detection is critical on a wide range of plants, in a wide range of industries. Brian Tinham looks at the issues with installation and particularly maintenance
The benefit of hindsight now
BP's long awaited report into the causes of its oil rig explosion and the worst oil spill in US history is finally out (page 8). The Deepwater Horizon saga makes grim reading, providing, as it does, a detailed study of the sequence of events BP believes led to the disaster – and the engineering, training and human inadequacies behind them.
The cost of complacency
If there is one lesson that emerges in the wake of last month's conclusion to the 2005 Buncefield disaster prosecution, it surely is the importance of vigilance. And that applies to all plants, not just to those in the chemicals, oil and gas industries that may be subject to the COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) regulations.
ICL Plastics disaster
With the publication last month of Lord Gill's inquiry report into the ICL Plastics Glasgow disaster, Brian Tinham reviews the lessons to be learned for plant engineers everywhere.
Flixborough revisited
At about 5.00pm on Saturday 1 June 1974, the Nypro plant at Flixborough near Scunthorpe, manufacturing caprolactam for nylon, exploded. 28 people lost their lives, 53 workers were hospitalised, and 1,821 houses and 167 shops and factories were damaged as the blast wave, felt more than four miles away, ripped through the community. Had the plant office block been occupied, the figures for deaths and injuries would have been far, far worse. The ensuing fires burned for 10 days and £250 million of plant assets (in today's terms) were reduced to twisted metal.
Deepwater Horizon
Last month's report by BP into the causes of its Gulf rig explosion and fire, and the lessons to be learned, point to a chilling sequence of failures. Brian Tinham reports
Bellows baloney
Contrary to popular misconception, metal bellows expansion joints are as useful as any other of the tools in the plant engineer's armoury - provided good mechanical engineering practice is followed. So says bellows manufacturer Teddington Engineered Solutions, the firm whose predecessor's equipment was linked to the Flixborough disaster 34 years ago.